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3 Université Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, VERIMAG, Grenoble, France
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1 Abstract
Universities and other educational organizations are adopting computer- and
internet-based assessment tools (herein called electronic exams, or e-exams for
short) to reach widespread audiences. While this makes examination tests more
accessible, it exposes them to new threats. Most current work on e-exam systems
aims at mitigating the risk of cheating, but recent scandals have shown that such
systems are also vulnerable to other attacks. In particular it turned out that not
all exam authorities can always be trusted, and that the use of networks makes
the systems vulnerable to outside attackers. Although not employed in practice,
in the scientific literature there are some proposals of protocols trying to address
these risks.
However, there are very few strategies to check such e-exam protocols for
security, and there is a lack of precise formal security definitions in this domain.
This paper fills this gap: in the formal framework of the applied π-calculus, we
define several fundamental authentication and privacy properties and establish
the first theoretical framework for the security analysis of e-exam protocols. In
particular, we consider authentication and integrity of the questions and an-
swers, as well as privacy of marks and secrecy of the questions before the exam.
Moreover, we also analyze anonymity of the examiners and candidates during
the grading process to ensure fairness.
As proof of concept we analyze two e-exam protocols with ProVerif, an au-
tomated protocol verification tool. The first “secure electronic exam system”
proposed in the literature turns out to have several severe problems, and fails at
ensuring all analyzed properties. The second protocol, called Remark!, is proved
to satisfy all the security properties assuming access control on the bulletin
board. We propose a simple protocol modification that removes the need of such
assumption though guaranteeing all the security properties.
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